Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive? by Andow, James
Do non-philosophers think epistemic
consequentialism is counterintuitive?*
James Andow
March 16, 2016
Abstract
Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible
i X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years
and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications.
There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will
not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial
empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demon-
strate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than
a philosophers’ worry—the folk seem to agree!
1 Introduction
A number of philosophers have recently explored consequentialist accounts in epis-
temology in some detail. These accounts are modeled on consequentialist theories
in normative ethics. A common variety of objection to consequentialist accounts
in normative ethics involves highlighting certain supposedly counterintuitive impli-
cations that such accounts have. Epistemic consequentialism is no dierent in this
respect. This is a problem for epistemic consequentialists unless they are prepared to
bite the bullet or deny the claim that the supposedly counterintuitive implications
are indeed counterintuitive.
Philosophers’ claims about which things are intuitive can no longer be taken
for granted. The advent of experimental philosophy means that the relevant claims
can be tested. Are such-and-such supposedly counterintuitive implications actually
so very contrary to our ordinary ways of thinking about the relevant philosophical
*This paper is forthcoming in Synthese. Please refer to the published version for citations, etc.
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quantities or concepts? In debates about consequentialism in ethics, experimental
philosophers have made considerable contributions.
This current paper aims to bring similar tools to the debate about epistemic ratio-
nality. While the current paper represents only a first step, the results reported sug-
gest that epistemic consequentialism does not accord with ordinary intuitions about
epistemic rationality. The paper proceeds as follows. §2 outlines epistemic conse-
quentialism using the more familiar ethical consequentialism as a reference point
and outlines the supposedly counterintuitive implications of epistemic consequen-
tialism. §3 briefly describes some experimental work on ethical consequentialism.
§4 describes and reports the results of two experiments conducted which examine
intuitions about epistemic consequentialism. §5 draws these results together, high-
lights some shortcomings, and makes some suggestions for the future direction of
this research.
2 Consequentialism: Epistemic and Ethical
Consequentialist theories in normative ethics will be familiar to most readers. Per-
haps the most familiar is act utilitarianism. According to this account, simply speak-
ing, pleasure is a positive moral value and pain is a negative moral value. It is only
morally permissible to do that which, of all the alternative actions available to an
agent, maximizes moral utility. The commitments of such a view can be illustrated
using an infamous ‘trolley case’ (this version is taken from Liao et al., 2011).
Switch A runaway trolley is headed toward five innocent people who are on the
track and who will be killed unless something is done. Abigail can push a
button, which will redirect the trolley onto a second track, saving the five
people. However, on this second track is an innocent bystander, who will be
killed if the trolley is turned onto this track.
Given the two available options, the act utilitarian thinks the only morally acceptable
action is to push the button and switch the tracks.
The question of which actions are justified morally speaking has an epistemic ana-
logue. Given my evidence, what am I warranted in believing? Which epistemic
doings (e.g., believing, inferring, judging) are epistemically permissible? The epis-
temic consequentialist holds that ‘the epistemically right (e.g., the justified) is to
be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (e.g., true belief )’
(Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn, 2014). The epistemic equivalent to the act utilitarian, the
direct epistemic consequentialist would endorse the claim that X is epistemically per-
missible i X maximizes epistemic value. Such accounts have received some notable
attention in recent years.1
1See, e.g., Berker (2013); Briesen (forthcoming); Carr (2015); Firth (1981); Goldman (1986);
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As many readers will know, act utilitarianism is often claimed to have counter-
intuitive implications. One stark case which has been used to make this point is Push
(again this version is taken from Liao et al., 2011).2
Push A runaway trolley is headed toward five innocent people who are on the track
and who will be killed unless something is done. Abigail can push a button,
which will activate a moveable platform that will move an innocent bystander
in front of the trolley. The runaway trolley would be stopped by hitting the
innocent bystander, thereby saving the five but killing the innocent bystander.
The consequences of acting and not acting in both Switch and Push are identical. So
the utilitarian should give the same answer in each. Taking the action which leads
to the death of only one person rather than five seems to maximize utility in each
case. However, critics of utilitarianism claim, the idea that it is morally acceptable
to push the button in Push is counterintuitive. At the very least, they claim, there
is an intuitive dierence between the two cases—one seems less acceptable than the
other—a dierence which the utilitarian cannot accommodate.3
Direct epistemic consequentialists face similar charges. For example, Jenkins
(2007) presents the following case which highlights the relevant counterintuitive
implication of a ‘veritist’ version of epistemic consequentialism:4
Truth Fairy Suppose you start with no reason to believe that p is true and no reason
to believe that it is false. The Truth Fairy is a very powerful being, and she
makes you the following credible oer: you accept p as true, and she will make
your epistemic situation very, very good overall. She will arrange for you to
have many, many true, justified, knowledgeable beliefs, and very, very few
false, unjustified or unknowledgeable ones. However, she does not guarantee
that your trust in p itself will have any particular epistemic status as a result of
her actions.
Jenkins claims that intuitions ‘rebel’ at the thought that trust in p would be epistemi-
cally permissible as direct epistemic consequentialism would suggest. As Jenkins and
Elstein (Forthcoming) put it,
Greaves (2013); Jenkins and Elstein (Forthcoming); Jenkins (2007); Littlejohn (2012); Maitzen (1995);
Percival (2002).
2In original presentations such cases, the innocent bystander is stated to be a ‘Fat Man’ (e.g.,
Thomson, 1985).
3It should be noted that act utilitarians typically do not contest the claim that such implications
are counterintuitive. The strategy rather tends to be to explain away the the relevant intuitions.
4Many others have articulated similar countrintuitive implications of epistemic consequentialist
accounts. I focus on Jenkins’s articulation here.
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Whatever kind of reasons the Truth Fairy might give you to trust in p,
she cannot by these means make it epistemically permissible for you to
do so.
Note that the Truth Fairy case is, in some respects, the epistemic analogue of Push.
The protagonist has an opportunity to maximize (epistemic) utility by doing some-
thing which might in other circumstances seem (epistemically) suspect. The ques-
tion is whether the maximization of utility is the driving concern. There are dis-
analogies too, but we will come to those later.
3 Testing Intuitions
When philosophers make points or arguments which rely upon claims about what is
and what is not intuitive, they are making empirical claims.5 These empirical claims
can be tested empirically.6
Cases such as Switch and Push have been subject to empirical attention. Indeed
the debate has gone far beyond whether or not people agree that acting in the Push
case is morally acceptable.7 Nonetheless, the results demonstrate that the act utilitar-
ian has some work to do; for, acting in cases such as Push is judged to be rather less
morally acceptable than in cases such as Switch. There are various types of response
open to the utilitarian. For instance, they might choose to bite the bullet or attempt
to explain away these intuitions (to give some reason for thinking that it is okay that
their account has these counterintuitive implications about such cases). However, the
empirical result demonstrate that the utilitarian has a heavy counterintuitive burden
which must be dealt with in some way.
It is worth noting another way that this debate in ethics might have gone. Had
the empirical results been dierent—had people been just as willing to sacrifice the
innocent bystander in Switch and Push—the result would have been a great relief to
the consequentialist. The results would have cleared utilitarians of a supposed large
counterintuitive burden. There’d be no bullet biting involved in sticking to their
guns, no pesky misfiring intuitions to explain away.
5I shall assume that the relevant points do rely upon such claims. However, some have recently
questioned the role of intuitive judgments in the use of hypothetical cases such as these in philosophy
(notably Cappelen, 2012; Deutsch, 2015).
6Testing philosophers’ empirical claims is one aspect of the aims of experimental philosophy. For
various perspectives on this developing field, see, Alexander (2012); Andow (Forthcoming); Feltz
(2009); Guttenplan (2011); Kauppinen (2007); Knobe (2007a,b, 2010); Knobe et al. (2011); Knobe
and Nichols (2008); Levin (2009); Machery and O’Neill (2014).
7See, e.g., Ahlenius and Tännsjö (2012); Fischer and Ravizza (1992); Greene (2008); Kahane
(2013); Liao et al. (2011); Lombrozo (2009); Petrinovich and O’Neill (1996); Petrinovich et al. (1993).
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The question this paper addresses could then be framed as follows: do epistemic
consequentialists truly face the counterintuitive burden which they are alleged to
face? One might wonder why this is a question worth asking. Is there any reason
to think there might be a mismatch between the intuitions of ordinary folks and
philosophers in this particular case? I think there are at least two reasons:
1. Various elements in ethical trolley cases are absent from the relevant epistemic
cases (inways that I take to diminish the likelihood of a ‘deontological’ response
in the epistemic case). For example:
(a) The high aect nature of Push. The idea of ordinary folks having a real
gut reaction, in the sense of one really felt in the pit of the stomach, about
epistemic cases like the Truth Fairy case seems somewhat fanciful. So,
it seems more likely that folks would treat epistemic equivalents of Push
and Switch in similar ways.
(b) The high cost of not acting in Push. However epistemic value and moral
value stack up, I take it no one is seriously going to entertain the idea
that a false belief or potentially false belief is as bad as a death by run-
away train. Consequently, folks may have few additional qualms in the
epistemic equivalent of Push, despite drawing an important line when it
comes to using someone in a way that kills them in order to save five lives.
(c) An analogue of the idea of an ‘innocent bystander’. In the moral case,
this notion of ‘innocence’ seems to bestow the bystander with a cer-
tain moral purity/sanctity/to-be-protectedness. In the relevant epistemic
cases, there doesn’t seem to be anything equivalent to this ‘innocence’,
e.g., some to-be-protected True Belief which would be destroyed in the
event of the protagonist pushing the button.
2. There is reason to doubt that people will entertain any strong prohibitions
when it comes to the epistemic domain. I take this consideration to count in
favor of the hypothesis that insofar as folks have any intuitions they will not
be one’s which put pressure on consequentialism. Why? In absence of strong
intuitive prohibitions, I think that:
(a) The default response to any case would be that the action is permissi-
ble. One might object at this point that the maximizing consequentialist
doesn’t think it would be okay, e.g., to not believe in the Truth Fairy
case. However, if ordinary folks had no strong intuitions about epis-
temic permissibility, then (i) the consequentialist would have much less
of a problem than if ordinary folks had strong anti-consequentialist intu-
itions as its opponents allege; failing to have intuitive support is a rather
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better position than having strong intuitive opposition, and (ii) moreover,
the problem the consequentialist would face would be one shared equally
with the opponent who thinks one should not take the Truth Fairy bar-
gain.
(b) If forced to make a choice, e.g., between believing and not believing
in the Truth Fairy case, it would be reasonable to expect folks to utilize
some kind of simple cost-benefit analysis. The only salient costs and ben-
efits in something like a Truth Fairy case are the truth and falsity of the
relevant claims/beliefs and so a simple cost-benefit analysis, absent any
strong intuitive prohibitions, might be expected to favor the consequen-
tialist option.
In other words, it is tempting to think that the unacceptability of believing, in the
Truth Fairy case, is something of a ‘philosopher’s reaction’ and thus the relevant
resistance to epistemic consequentialism a something of a ‘philosopher’s worry’.
So, there is specific reason to think it is worth testing philosophers’ claims about
intuitions about epistemic rationality. However, the issues I have just raised also draw
attention to some diculties which the current project faces. One advantage in the
project of testing moral intuitions about the permissibility of actions in trolley cases
is that the cases (e.g., Push or its predecessors) and the questions are comparatively
comprehensible by the average participant in an experiment. In the current project,
testing epistemic intuitions about the epistemic permissibility of such things (e.g.,
taking the Truth Fairy’s bargain), we do not have that advantage. The Truth Fairy
case is rather less down to earth and it employs concepts which we cannot expect
the average participant to understand (e.g., ‘epistemic status’). One solution would
be to recruit only participants who were familiar with such concepts.8 However,
given that such a sample would primarily consist of participants with at least phi-
losophy undergraduate degrees, such an experiment would have limited claim on
testing ordinary pretheoretic judgments about such cases.9
4 Two Experiments
In this section, I report two experiments which represent a first step in testing intu-
itions about epistemic consequentialism. The design attempts to overcome some of
the diculties discussed in the previous section.
8Let me clarify. What I think the average participant is unfamiliar with is primarily the philo-
sophical vocabulary, e.g., the word ‘epistemic’. I do think they are familiar with the concept in the
sense that they distinguish between epistemically permissible and impermissible beliefs.
9I shall assume that it is such judgments which are relevant to the project. However, I acknowledge
that this is likely not completely uncontroversial. Nonetheless, I won’t be defending my stance.
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4.1 Experiment 1
In a first experiment, I attempted to see whether participants saw an intuitive dif-
ference between cases in which a protagonist can maximize utility by some neutral
means or (like in the Truth Fairy case) maximize utility by somemeans which might
otherwise be judged epistemically dubious (e.g., accepting a claim without any ev-
idence).
Participants 80 participants were recruited using Prolific Academic.10 All partic-
ipants were resident in the UK, native English speakers, and at least 18 years old.
Mean age was 30 years old. 35 participants identified as Male. Participants were
rewarded for their participation (£0.25 @ £7.50/h based on a predicted completion
time of 2 minutes).
Methods The design was between-subjects with each participant being assigned
to one of four conditions. In each condition, participants were presented with a
hypothetical scenario involving a researcher named Sarah. The main contrast of
interest is that between the following two scenarios.
(a) Equipment Sarah is conducting some research. She is investigating 5 key claims.
Given the current direction of her research, her results will be wrong about
these 5 key claims. Sarah could make a particular change in the direction of her
research. She could use some dierent equipment. By making this change, she
could ensure that her results are correct about 4 of the 5 key claims. However,
her results would still be wrong about the remaining claim.
(b) False Assumption Sarah is conducting some research. She is investigating 5
key claims. Given the current direction of her research, her results will be
wrong about these 5 key claims. Sarah could make a particular change in the
direction of her research. She could make a particular assumption about 1 of
the 5 claims and use that assumption in her research. By making this change,
she could ensure that her results are correct about the other 4 claims. However,
this assumption about the remaining claim happens to be false.
This second scenario is similar to the Truth Fairy cases discussed above. Sarah
can maximize utility by making an assumption without evidence which happens
to be false (something which in other circumstances would generally not be okay).
By stating that the epistemic state used to maximize utility ‘happens to be false’,
however, False Assumption departs from the structure of the Truth Fairy case. In a
10Prolific Academic is a UK-based alternative to Amazon M-Turk. See https://
prolificacademic.co.uk/.
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Truth Fairy case, the accepted claim is not stated to be false, rather it is stated, e.g.,
that the protagonist has no fairy-independent epistemic reason either for accepting
of rejecting the claim in question. In order to explore whether truth/falsity of the
relevant claim made a dierence to participant’s intuitions, two further cases were
used.
(c) True Assumption Sarah is conducting some research She is investigating 5 key
claims. Given the current direction of her research, her results will be wrong
about these 5 key claims. Sarah could make a particular change in the direction
of her research. She could make a particular assumption about 1 of the 5 claims
and use that assumption in her research. By making this change, she could
ensure that her results are correct about the other 4 claims. Moreover, this
assumption about the remaining claim happens to be true.
(d) No Reason Assumption Sarah is conducting some research. She is investigat-
ing 5 key claims. Given the current direction of her research, her results will
be wrong about these 5 key claims. Sarah could make a particular change in
the direction of her research. She could make a particular assumption about 1
of the 5 claims and use that assumption in her research. Bymaking this change,
she could ensure that her results are correct about the other 4 claims. How-
ever, she has no evidence for or against the assumption, she has no particular
reason either for thinking it is true or for thinking it is false.
In each condition, the main case was followed by this claim in order to guard
against the potential complications introduced if participants thought Sarah was sim-
ply a poor researcher:
Whether or not Sarah changes her research, any false results she obtains
are not due to any mistake in her research. It is just one of those things,
research doesn’t always produce accurate results.
Then participants answered a single question on a sliding scale from 0 (completely
disagree) to 100 (completely agree). The starting position of the slider was 50. The
wording of the statement was
‘It is okay for Sarah to change her research by (a) using some dier-
ent equipment / (b) making an assumption which happens to be false
/ (c) making an assumption which happens to be true / (d) making an
assumption for which she has no evidence.’
Finally, some basic demographic information was collected.
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Table 1: Median and means by scenario
Median Mean
(a) Equipment 71 68.47
(b) False Assumption 18.5 26.9
(c) True Assumption 32 41
(d) No Reason Assumption 35.5 38.9
Table 2: p-values and eect sizes for pairwise comparisons of medians
(b) (c) (d)
(a) p = .001**, φ = .546 p = .003**, φ = .47 p = .023*, φ = .363
(b) - p = .585, φ = .085 p = .197, φ = .204
(c) - - p = .443, φ = .120
Results A clear pattern is suggested by the median and mean scores for each sce-
nario (shown in Table 1): agreement in the Equipment case and disagreement in
the other cases. The scores for the four scenarios were compared using Mood’s me-
dian test.11 There was a significant omnibus eect, χ2(3, N = 80) = 13.285, p =
.004, φ = .408. Post-hoc chi-square tests revealed that a greater proportion of par-
ticipants in the Equipment condition (a) gave a score at or above the median than in
each of the other scenarios (b, c, d) (see Table 2 for eect sizes and p-values). There
was no significant dierence between the three ‘assumption’ conditions (b, c, d) .
Discussion It seems clear that, while participants are in general happy with mak-
ing changes to maximize epistemic utility, they are not happy with those changes
involving the use of an assumption for which the protagonist has no evidence. This
suggests that our participants have intuitions clearly in line with the Truth Fairy type
cases and that maximizing epistemic utility are not the only grounds upon which
they judge the acceptability of the doings of epistemic agents. Note also that whether
the assumption happens to be true, happens to be false, or is not stated, seems to have
no eect on participants’ intuitions. Were there a large (veritist) consequentialist
component to their intuitions about these cases, one would expect the truth/falsity
of the assumption to have an eect.
11This is a close non-parametric equivalent to a one-way ANOVA and can be used to compare
more than two groups (unlike, e.g., Man-Whitney’s U test). Non-parametric tests were used as
(a) visual inspection suggests a bimodal distribution for some scenarios, and (b) Shapiro-Wilk tests
confirm that the data can’t be assumed to be normally distributed (scenario a, W(19)=.881, p=.023;
scenario, b W(20)=.842, p=.004; scenario c, W(21)=.938, p=.201; scenario d, W(20)=.897, p=.036).
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4.2 Experiment 2
In a second experiment, I looked at another class of cases. These are designed to be
more directly analogous to Switch and Push (the moral cases discussed earlier). The
cases in experiment 1 are not directly analogous for an important reason: they are
not really cases in which the protagonist has an opportunity to maximize utility by
bringing about some negative outcome which would not have come about anyway.
For example, in Equipment, Sarah was going to be wrong about the claim which
she ends up being wrong about regardless of whether she makes the change.
Because of this feature of Equipment, the decision Sarah faces is not whether to
choose one negative thing in order to prevent a dierent more negative thing. This
is important since a critic might argue that the dierence observed in experiment 1
would go away if presented with versions of the equipment scenario and assumption
scenarios in which Sarah did have to make such a decision. So, the second experi-
ment, puts this thought to the test.
Participants 60 participants were recruited using Prolific Academic. Participants
who had already taken Experiment 1 were prevented from taking part. All partic-
ipants were resident in the UK, native English speakers, and at least 18 years old.
Mean age was 29.7 years old. 26 participants identified as Male. Participants were
rewarded for their participation (£0.25 @ £7.50/h based on a predicted completion
time of 2 minutes).
Methods The designwas between subjects with each participant being assigned to
one of three conditions. Again, in each condition, participants were presented with
a hypothetical scenario involving Sarah a researcher. This time the main contrast is
between two cases. This time the cases are stricter analogues to the simple switch
and push trolley cases.
(e) Equipment-switch Sarah is conducting some research. She is investigating 5
key claims: A, B, C, D, and E. Given the current direction of her research, her
results will be correct about 1 of the 5 key claims (A), but incorrect about the
remaining 4 (B, C, D, and E).
Sarah could make a particular change in the direction of her research. She
could use some dierent equipment. By making this change, she could en-
sure that her results are correct about 4 of the 5 key claims (B, C, D, and E).
However, her results about the other claim (A) would be incorrect.
(f ) False Assumption-push Sarah is conducting some research. She is investigat-
ing 5 key claims: A, B, C,D, and E.Given the current direction of her research,
10
her results will be correct about 1 of the 5 key claims (A), but incorrect about
the remaining 4 (B, C, D, and E).
Sarah could make a particular change in the direction of her research. She
could make a particular assumption about 1 of the 5 claims (A) and use that
assumption in her research. By making this change, she could ensure that her
results are correct about 4 of the 5 key claims (B, C, D, and E). However, her
assumption about the other claim (A) happens to be incorrect.
A third scenario was also used to continue to allow comparisons with intuitions about
more Truth Fairy type cases in which the valence of the used epistemic state is un-
known.
(g) No Reason Assumption-fairy Sarah is conducting some research. She is in-
vestigating 5 key claims: A, B, C, D, and E. Given the current direction of
her research, her results will be correct about 1 of the 5 key claims (A), but
incorrect about the remaining 4 (B, C, D, and E).
Sarah could make a particular change in the direction of her research. She
could make a particular assumption about 1 of the 5 claims (A) and use that
assumption in her research. By making this change, she could ensure that her
results are correct about 4 of the 5 key claims (B, C, D, and E). However, she
has no evidence for or against the other claim (A), she has no particular reason
either for thinking it is true or for thinking it is false.
In each condition, the passage was followed by the same qualification as in Ex-
periment 1, the probes were the same, and demographic data were collected.
Results The median and mean scores for each scenario are shown in Table 3. The
same clear pattern is suggested.12 Mood’s median test revealed a significant omnibus
eect, χ2(2, N = 60) = 21.758, p < .0005, φ = .602. Post-hoc chi-square tests
revealed medium to large significant dierences between Equipment and each other
condition (see Table 4 for details). There were no significant dierences between
the two assumption condiions.
Discussion It seems that the dierence observed in Experiment 1 is not best at-
tributed to the fact that the equipment scenario did not involve Sarah bringing about
a new negative consequence which would not otherwise have happened. The sce-
narios used in this second experiment do not have this feature—and are so more
analogous to the Switch and Push trolley cases—but we still find similar results.
12Again, Shapiro-Wilk tests confirm that the data can’t be assumed to be normally distributed
(scenario e, W (20) = .843, p = .004; scenario f, W (20) = .860, p = .008; scenario g, W (20) =
.832, p = .003). So, again, non-parametric tests are used.
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Table 3: Median and means by scenario
Scenario Mean Median
(e) Equipment-switch 72.4 84.5
(f ) False Assumption-push 32.3 21
(g) No Reason Assumption-fairy 25.35 20
Table 4: p-values and eect sizes for pairwise comparisons of medians
(f ) (g)
(e) p < .0005**, φ = .568, p < .0005**, φ = .704
(f ) – p = .288, φ = .168
Again, note that whether the assumption is stated to be false seems to have no ef-
fect on participants’ intuitions (a result which wouldn’t fit well with the idea that
participants are veritist epistemic consequentialists).
5 Does epistemic consequentialism have counterin-
tuitive implications?
While further work is needed, I tentatively conclude that epistemic consequentialism
seems to have consequences which are counterintuitive to the folk and not simply to
philosophers. Direct epistemic consequentialism says that X is epistemically permis-
sible i it maximizes epistemic utility. In the assumption cases, Sarah’s assumption
should be judged epistemically permissible by such standards. My results suggest that
this consequence is clearly counterintuitive. If correct, these results mean that the
supposed counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is not just a ‘philoso-
phers’ worry’ as one might have thought.13
I should emphasize that my conclusions are made only tentatively in light of the
small sample size and the nature of the probe used in both Experiment 1 and 2. In
order to avoid asking participants to judge whether the relevant epistemic doings
were ‘warranted’ or ‘epistemically permissible’—terms which one shouldn’t expect
participants to understand—the main probe used asks simply whether the relevant
13Of course, the epistemic consequentialist may find some way to explain away such intuitions,
be otherwise prepared to bite the bullet, or adapt their account in order to avoid these implications
(see, e.g., the attempt in Jenkins and Elstein, Forthcoming). One potential way to accommodate
the results might be to suggest that participants are operating with a veritist version of epistemic
consequentialism which assigns a greater negative value to false beliefs (or judgements/assumptions)
than positive value to true beliefs, e.g., false beliefs are more than five times worse than true beliefs
are good. It would be interesting to explore this possibility further.
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epistemic doings are ‘okay’. I think participants’ responses likely do reflect their
thoughts on the epistemic permissibility of the relevant epistemic doings. However,
this isn’t the only available interpretation. It is possible that the probe used may
simply tap participants’ moral attitudes. For example, the results could be explained by
participants judging the use of dierent equipment to be morally permissible but the
making of assumptions without independent reason to be morally impermissible.14
However, I don’t want to be too concessive. I’ll be the first to admit that the
phrasing adopted in this paper is likely not the final word in how best to ask par-
ticipants about epistemic permissibility. This is a tricky issue and further work will
hopefully find even better solutions. Nonetheless, I think the current results can be
taken to be suggestive since, on the face of it, it seems rather unlikely that partici-
pants are reporting moral attitudes. I say this because it is unlikely that participants
find the act of making an assumption to be morally objectionable. Even in the cases
in which Sarah’s possible assumption turns out to be false, the scenarios give no sense
that Sarah is engaged in any clearly morally objectionable act of deception or mis-
leading.15 So the take home message should be that (tentatively) this initial study of
intuitions about epistemic rationality shows that epistemic consequentialism really
does run contrary to ordinary folks intuitions—not just to those of philosophers.
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